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RESEARCH INTERESTS

Microeconomic Theory, Market Design, Political Economy, Information Economics.

EMPLOYMENT

Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

2018 - present Assistant Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences.
2018 - 2019 Donald P. Jacobs Scholar.

Other (Prior to Ph.D.)

2010 Consultant, World Bank Task Team on “The Governance and Political Economy Constraints in Emerging Post-Conflict Sierra Leone.”
2008 - 2009 Pre-Doctoral Research Fellow. Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University.

EDUCATION

2013 - present Ph.D. Candidate, Economics, Stanford University (expected June 2018).
Dissertation: *Market Design with Dynamic Populations*.
2009 - 2013 Ph.D. Candidate (ABD), Political Science, Stanford University.
2004 - 2008 A.B. History, *Magna Cum Laude*, Harvard College.

RESEARCH

Publications

“Reinventing the Wheel: The Economic Benefits of Wheeled Transportation in Early Colonial British West Africa” with James A. Robinson and Stanley L. Engerman (2014), in Emmanuel Akyeampong, Robert Bates, Nathan Nunn and James A. Robinson (eds.), *Africa’s Development in Historical Perspective*, Cambridge University Press.

“He Who Counts Elects: Economic Elites, Political Elites, and Electoral Fraud” (2015), with Leopoldo Fergusson and James A. Robinson, *Economics and Politics*, 27, 124-159.

“Indirect Rule and State Weakness in Africa: Sierra Leone in Comparative Perspective” with Daron Acemoglu, Philip Osafo-Kwaako, and James A. Robinson (2016) in Sebastian Edwards, Simon Johnson, and David Weil (eds.), *African Successes: Modernization and Development*, University of Chicago Press.

Working Papers

Privacy in Bargaining: The Case of Endogenous Entry
[Revise and Resubmit, American Economic Review]

I study the role of privacy in bargaining. A seller makes offers every instant, without commitment, to a privately informed buyer. There are potential competing buyers (entrants) who observe something about the negotiation and can choose to interrupt it by triggering a bidding war. As entrants learn about ongoing disagreement, they update their beliefs about the type of the buyer. The sellers lack of commitment reverses the seemingly intuitive effects of publicity. If learning that the buyer's type is lower encourages entrants, so that the seller "should" want to make publicly observable offers that lure in entrants against the incumbent buyer, then in equilibrium the seller typically prefers private bargaining. If learning that the buyer's type is lower discourages entrants, so that the seller "should" want to hide her offers to avoid frightening away entrants, then in equilibrium the seller prefers public bargaining.

Auction Timing and Market Thickness (with Shota Ichihashi)
[Previously circulated as "When to Hold an Auction?"]

An auctioneer faces a pool of potential bidders that changes over time. She can delay the auction at a cost, in the hopes of having a thicker market later on. We identify a property of the distribution of bidder values—its price elasticity—that governs the distortions caused by revenue maximization: a seller inefficiently over-invests in market thickness (delays the auction excessively) if that elasticity is increasing, and under-invests if it is decreasing. We also show that dynamically responding to changes in the bidder pool is essential: committing to delay until an optimal deadline can waste most of the achievable revenue.

Pricing Responses to Platform Leakage: Optimal Platform Design When Matches Are Irrevocable.

I analyze a two-period model of a monopolist platform running a two-sided one-to-one matching market between workers and firms, where (i) agents can contract privately off the platform once they are matched (matches are irrevocable); (ii) they differ in how likely they are to want further business with a match (their durability); and (iii) firms have private information about their durability. I characterize the profit-maximizing matching and pricing policies. I show that the platform typically wants to impose a novel kind of distortion. In the first period, the platform wants to give firms either extremely high durability matches, or extremely low durability ones, but it would rather leave more firms unmatched than give any of them "medium" durability matches. This is in contrast to a seemingly related static model where a platform matches agents with privately known taste for quality to goods of different quality: in that case, the platform might price the bottom tier of agents out of the market, but it would never sell a low quality good before a medium quality one.

Other Research (Political Science)

The Political Consequences of Civil Wars: Lessons from Sierra Leone and Colombia (with James A. Robinson).

The Architecture of a Fragile State: The Case of Sierra Leone (with James A. Robinson).

Fieldwork

Sierra Leone Summers 2009, 2010 (three months total). Conducted dozens of interviews and focus groups across the country: (a) as a consultant for a World Bank study on the political economy of decentralization, the public sector, and the institution of the chieftaincy; (b) for research on Sierra Leone's paramilitary movement and its relation to the Mende political elite.

CONFERENCE AND SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS

2020 (Scheduled) Monash Business School, University of Melbourne, University of New South Wales, NYU Abu Dhabi, Penn State.

2019 Cowles Foundation, Bargaining Experiments Empirics and Theory (BI Norwegian), Decentralization 2019 (University of Michigan).

- 2018 SITE (Stanford), Econometric Society (North American Summer Meetings). Job Market: Cornell, Johns Hopkins, USC, EIEF, Bonn, Kellogg MEDS.
- 2017 IO Theory Conference (short presentation as JIE Fellow, Duke), Marketplace Innovation Conference (poster session, Stanford University) Decentralization Conference (University of Michigan/ Center of the Study of Complex Systems) IIOC (Rising Stars session, Northeastern University).
- 2011 State Fragility Workshop (International Growth Center, Oxford University, St. Anne's College).
- 2010 Working Group on African Political Economy (UC Berkeley).

TEACHING

Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

- 2019 - Pricing Strategies (MBA Elective).

Stanford University

- 2017 TA for Graduate Microeconomic Theory (for econ Ph.D. students). Introduction to cooperative game theory, information economics, mechanism design.
- 2011, 2010 TA for Advanced Political Methodology (for political science Ph.D. students). Introduction to Asymptotic Theory, Maximum Likelihood, Causal Inference, Nonparametrics. 4.9/5 in teaching evaluations for 2011.
- 2011 TA for Game Theory for Political Scientists (for political science Ph.D. students).

HONORS, AWARDS, & FELLOWSHIPS

- 2017 Journal of Industrial Economics Fellow.
- 2017 - 2018 Kapnick Foundation Fellowship, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- 2016 Sean Buckley Memorial Award, best second-year paper, Stanford Economics Department and Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- 2014 - 2015 Forman Fellowship in Economics, outstanding first year performance in Economics Ph.D.
- 2013 - 2014 Economics Department Fellowship, Stanford University.
- 2009 - 2013 Alejandro and Lida Zaffaroni Graduate Fellowship, Stanford University.
- 2008 - 2009 Pre-doctoral Research Fellowship, Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University.
- 2007 Patricia King Fellowship, Harvard College.
- 2004 - 2008 Davis UWC Scholarship, Harvard College.
- 2001 Colombian Team, Iberian-American Physics Olympiad.

PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES

R, Unix and command-line tools/shell-scripting, Matlab, Stata, LaTeX. Working knowledge of Python, C++.

LANGUAGES

Native-speaker proficiency in English, Spanish. Reading proficiency in Portuguese and French.

Last updated: February 29, 2020